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ABSTRACT
The objective of this investigation was to examine the implications of the Brazilian federative structure in the comparative evaluation of 
public-spending performance in the health sector. Its further aim was to discuss the accountability of municipal public administrators 
and evaluate the technical efficiency of the municipalities of the São Paulo Metropolitan Region in terms of primary health-care. Primary 
health-care is the only sub-function that is the exclusive responsibility of local managers. Other health responsibilities are shared by the 
municipalities and the other federation entities, union and states. To explore the characteristics of cooperative and competitive federa-
lism, data collected from the municipalities and aggregated for the different health regions that comprise the metropolitan region were 
analyzed. The study’s focus was the technical efficiency, which is theability of an entity to obtain maximum outputs with fewer inputs. The 
analysis was performed using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. The results showed a wide dispersion of municipality data 
in terms of both expenditure and the number of procedures performed, including coverage of the main primary health-care programs: 
the Family Health Program (Programa de Saúde da Família – PSF) and the Community Health Agents Program (Programa de Agentes 
Comunitários de Saúde – PACS). The results show that less than 20% of the municipalities are efficient. The analysis of the municipalities 
within their respective regions suggests the prevalence of competitive over cooperative practices. Such information may help improve the 
integration of services in health-care networks and encourage the reconsideration of the agreements existing between municipalities in a 
given health-care region. Furthermore, this article can contribute to the current debate on controllership in the public sector by outlining 
the potentialities and limitations of the methods used to generate information for decision making.
Keywords: Competition and cooperation in federalism. Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde – SUS). Comparative performan-
ce assessment. Efficiency of public spending. Metropolitan Region of São Paulo.
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 1 IntRoductIon
The theme of this article is the comparative evaluation 
of the performance of public managers in the context of 
Brazilian federalism, particularly regarding the use of bud-
getary resources. Benchmarking standards can be useful 
in replacing fixed budgetary targets with evaluations that 
adjust to the production technology and socio-economic 
circumstances faced by organizations (Merchant & Otley, 
2007). More specifically, the article discusses the accounta-
bility of municipal administrators regarding actions under-
taken within the scope of health policy.
Given the public administration’s current focus on re-
sults, there is the need to develop theoretical-empirical ba-
ses for the control functions that are performed by the ma-
nagers and internal and external control agencies and that 
function as an aid to social control. To this end, it is neces-
sary to consider the specificities of the activities developed 
by the public sector that may differ from those pursued by 
private companies when goals are vague or complex; ou-
tputs are difficult to measure; the effects of interventions 
are not easily identified; and the activity is not always repe-
titive (Hofstede, 1981).
In addition, it is necessary to identify the relationship 
between the public-sector structure, policy design and the 
performance evaluation of government organizations. In 
the case of Brazil, the federalist structure, with elements of 
cooperation and competition in public policies must not be 
disregarded, since these factors interfere with performance 
and the ability to evaluate it and consequently with public-
sector accountability.
The Federal Constitution of 1988 defined the responsi-
bilities to be shared by the federal, state and municipal go-
vernments for a wide range of public policies, including the 
Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde – SUS), 
which is characterized by a complex system of intergover-
nmental relationships. "The management of the Unified 
Health System is constructed in a solidary and cooperative 
form, with mutual support through commitments made in 
the Bipartite (Comissões Intergestores Bipartite – CIB) and 
Tripartite (CIT) Inter-management Commissions" (Ordi-
nance/MS no. 399/2006, emphasis added). 
In the search for health-care that is universal, equita-
ble and comprehensive for all citizens, the federal gover-
nment is responsible for formulating and standardizing 
the public health-care system at the national level. The 
municipalities are considered the main health-service 
providers, with full and exclusive responsibility regar-
ding the primary health-care sub-function, which is 
considered the gateway to the health-care system. The 
states coordinate the decentralization process and, in 
a complementary manner, actions performed by local 
managers. They also provide them with technical and 
financial support. The municipal health policy must be 
consistent with the state policy, and the state policy, in 
turn, must be consistent with the national policy (Ordi-
nance/MS. No. 399/2006). 
In the process of decentralization and hierarchiza-
tion, health-care services with a lower degree of comple-
xity are available to the user at health-care units located 
near the user’s home. Specialized services or those with 
a higher degree of complexity are reached through re-
ference mechanisms, which are organized by managers 
across the three tiers of government. Regionalization 
guides the decentralization of health-care services and 
the processes of negotiation and agreement between the 
state and municipal managers. The objectives of regio-
nalization include the rationalization of costs and the 
optimization of resources, leading to economies of scale 
in health-care services on the regional level (Ordinance/
MS no. 399/2006). 
Thus, the structure of the health-care system imposes 
restrictions on the evaluation of the performance of the 
municipal managers, given that only in the primary health-
care sub-function can the municipal managers be held ac-
countable for what occurs in their territory. On other levels 
of complexity, there are flows of resources and patients be-
tween the municipalities that are agreed upon by the mana-
gers of the health-care system. 
Abrúcio (2005, p. 41) notes that one analytic vector 
for federalism refers to the problem of intergovernmental 
coordination, or "forms of integration, sharing and joint 
decision-making present in the federations." Additio-
nally, the same author writes that this problem is highly 
important in terms of the complexity of intergovernmen-
tal relations because one of its causes is the expansion or 
maintenance of the welfare state in an environment in 
which resources are scarce. "This situation calls for better 
government performance, with strong pressure for saving 
(cutting expenditures and costs), efficiency (doing more 
with less) and effectiveness (having an impact on the cau-
ses of social problems)." 
In this context, the present study aimed to examine the 
implications of the Brazilian federative structure for the 
comparative evaluation of public spending in the health 
sector and to evaluate the technical efficiency of the muni-
cipalities in the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo in provi-
ding primary health-care services.
The focus of this study was the evaluation of techni-
cal efficiency  which is the ability of an entity to obtain 
maximum outputs with fewer inputs. The analysis was 
performed using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
method, which is a non-parametric technique based on 
linear programming that allowed us to establish a me-
asure of relative efficiency between different decision-
making units. 
The São Paulo Metropolitan Region is divided into 
seven health-care regions and is composed of municipa-
lities with different socioeconomic profiles; financial and 
managerial capacities. Thus, the comparative evaluation, 
allows us to identify the municipalities with the worst 
performance and those that serve as references for other 
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jurisdictions and therefore to facilitate learning from the 
practices adopted in each municipality. Comparative eva-
luation is one of the positive aspects of competitive federa-
lism. Such information may help improve the integration 
of health services in health-care networks and encourage 
the reconsideration of agreements between municipali-
ties in a given health-care region. For example, instead 
of focusing on increasing the supply of medium- and hi-
gh-complexity services, strategies could be prioritized to 
strengthen primary health-care, including the better use 
of available resources.
Besides identifying possible developments that might 
affect health-sector decisions, the present study may contri-
bute to the current debate on public-sector controllership 
by outlining the potentialities and the limitations of the 
methods used to generate information for decision making. 
As noted by Broadbent and Guthrie (2008), it is important 
for those studying this topic to understand how accounting 
technologies are representative of the social context and at 
the same time are represented by this context. 
Brazilian public-sector organizations make available 
several databases to ensure transparency and to facili-
tate performance evaluation by the society. However, 
these data often do not translate into relevant decision-
making information for the public officials who control 
the scope and effectiveness of public policy. This arti-
cle discusses the DEA comparative performance assess-
ment, which can be an alternative to operational audits 
and increase the scope of Court of Accounts activities 
regarding the control of public expenditure. Thus, the 
DEA comparative performance assessment integrates 
the efforts to move from a purely formal audit to the 
evaluation of results. 
Additionally, the analysis developed in the present stu-
dy can facilitate social control by generating a synthesized 
measure of performance in terms of the actual information 
generated and of the reduction of analysis time, which is 
one of the constraints in performance evaluation. There-
fore, the focus is on bridging the gap between the fields of 
control and accountability.
 2 coMPEtItIvE and cooPERatIvE FEdERalISM, tHE unIFIEd HEaltH 
SyStEM and accountabIlIty FoR MunIcIPal GovERnMEnt 
ExPEndItuRES 
Like 24 other countries, Brazil has chosen a territorial 
division of government that leads "to the creation of insti-
tutions that make the task of governing more complex and 
that face the challenge of incorporating heterogeneous po-
pulations and regions into a single nation, ensuring their 
relative autonomy" (Souza, 2008, p. 29).
The literature contains several justifications for the 
creation of a federation and numerous definitions of fede-
ralism, each with a different emphasis with respect to the 
explanatory characteristics and variables of federal syste-
ms. Souza (2008) maps the theoretical lines of federalism 
that are considered to be the most influential or the most 
applicable to the Brazilian case: (1) federalism as the decen-
tralization of political institutions and economic activities, 
(2) federalism as a pact, (3) federalism and democracy and 
(4) federalism and federations.
The first two approaches include elements important 
for the topic discussed in this article. In the first, federalism 
is viewed as "a system in which the distribution of political 
and economic activity is spatially decentralized within a 
national territory," facilitating competition between politi-
cal markets and thereby promoting political and economic 
efficiency. The analysis focuses on the political divisions, 
conflicts and trade-offs among the entities that constitute 
the federation (Souza, 2008, p. 29). 
In this respect, the analysis is part of the literature on 
fiscal federalism that "sees federalism as a decentralizing 
mechanism capable of promoting competition between 
governments to create or preserve the advantages of a ma-
rket economy" (Souza, 2008, p. 30). One representative of 
this theoretical position is Tiebout (1956), who developed 
a model in which fiscal decentralization would reveal con-
sumer/voter preferences. That would be so because each 
jurisdiction would be able to provide different packages of 
goods and taxes that would best fit consumer/voter pre-
ferences. They would choose and head to the jurisdiction 
that offers the best package for their preferences , “voting 
with their feet”. According to this view, competition would 
promote economic efficiency.
A classic study of the second approach is that of Elazar, 
for whom the simplest definition of federalism is "self-rule 
plus shared rule" (1991, p. 12), which implies the "combina-
tion, via agreement or alliance, of the principle of unity with 
the principle of internal self-government" (Souza, 2008, p. 
31). Each tier of government (federal, state and municipal) 
has its autonomy guaranteed. At the same time, there is a 
relationship of interdependence between them.
In essence, a federal arrangement is one of partnership, 
established and regulated by a covenant, whose internal 
relationships reflect the special kind of sharing that must 
prevail among the partners, based on a mutual recogni-
tion of the integrity of each partner and the attempt to 
foster a special unity among them. (Elazar, 1991, p. 5).
As noted by Abrúcio (2005, p. 43), shared sovereignty 
can be maintained over time if there is an equilibrium be-
tween the autonomy and interdependence of the members 
who signed the covenant. For Elazar (1991, p. 34), a key 
feature of the federation is non-centralization, and there is 
a “dispersion of powers among many centers whose legiti-
mate authority is constitutionally guaranteed.”
Therefore, it is impossible for a government to take the-
se rights from others, as in the case of the federal union in 
relation to the states and municipalities. Moreover, interde-
pendence is achieved in a matrix structure because power 
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is distributed so that the hierarchy of the various govern-
mental tiers is not fixed. Each tier of government has a gre-
ater relative importance in one specific area but not to the 
point of becoming a more influential center of power and 
imposing behavior on the other governmental tiers. "In a 
matrix, there are no higher or lower power centers, only 
larger or smaller arenas of political decision making and 
action." (Elazar, 1991, p. 37). 
Federalism as the decentralization of political and eco-
nomic institutions has the important characteristic of com-
petition among federal agencies, notably at the sub-natio-
nal levels. These levels are considered responsible for the 
provision of various public goods, and for this provision 
to occur, the sub-national governments must compete for 
funding. To ensure the autonomy of the sub-national go-
vernments, the constitution limits the federal government's 
activity to a few areas of public policy and establishes infre-
quent power-sharing between the central and sub-national 
governments (Franzese, 2010). 
Cooperation is a key element of federalism as a co-
venant. The responsibilities for various public policies 
are shared among federal entities, with the federal go-
vernment assuming the role of formulating a substantial 
portion of public policy and the state governments being 
charged with policy implementation. Tax competition is 
replaced by a system of joint taxation and vertical and 
horizontal equalization (Franzese, 2010). "Cooperative 
federalism has institutions that encourage regional ac-
tors to work together, sharing the power among them in 
a functional manner and providing tasks to be performed 
together" (Franzese, 2010, p. 68).
In intergovernmental relations, both the competition 
and cooperation between the spheres of government 
have positive and negative aspects. Federal competition 
is important for each other’s checks and balances among 
governments. In addition, federal competition can faci-
litate the search for innovation and improve the perfor-
mance of local administrations, while avoiding excessive 
sharing and unaccountability and the paternalism and 
parasitism caused by the dependence on higher spheres 
of power. However, excessive competition can affect the 
solidarity between parties and encourage financial com-
petition between the tiers of government. Additionally, 
the view that citizens vote with their feet, if taken to an 
extreme, can cause health-care distribution to deterio-
rate if governments adopt a strategy of low levels of ta-
xation and as a result provide only a minimum level of 
service (Abrúcio, 2005.)
According to Abrúcio (2005), federal cooperation fa-
vors the optimization of common resources; assistance 
to poor or less powerful governments in the execution of 
certain tasks; the integration of a shared set of public po-
licies; and the dissemination of successful administrative 
formulas. Additionally, it fights predatory financial beha-
vior. However, poorly measured cooperation can result in 
subordination more often than partnership and may lead 
to the "joint decision trap." In the latter, "all decisions are 
shared as much as possible and depend on the approval 
of virtually all federal actors." This degree of cooperation 
causes a tendency to standardize policies, "a process that 
can slow the innovative momentum of government tiers, 
weakening intergovernmental checks and balances and 
complicating the accountability of public administration" 
(Abrúcio, 2005, p. 44).
Given the negative effects that poorly measured com-
petition and cooperation can generate for society, what is 
sought is a combination of the characteristics that stand out 
as positive and a minimization of those characteristics that 
are negative. However, this solution is not without proble-
ms because it increases the cost of operating the system. As 
noted by Aguirre (2007), any combination of the charac-
teristics of these two types of federalism represents higher 
transaction costs.
The State’s performance of its primary role as a promo-
ter of social welfare is affected by working federal models 
- more interested in competition or cooperation. Accor-
ding to Franzese (2010), the comparative literature indica-
tes that cooperative federalism favors the expansion of the 
Welfare State, the same way social policies can transform 
the federal model through the introduction of cooperation 
mechanisms.
In Brazil, the Federal Constitution of 1988 defined the 
powers common to a wide range of public policies, inclu-
ding health-care policy. Citizens have a constitutional gua-
rantee of the right to universal, equitable and comprehen-
sive health-care that must be met by the joint action of the 
federal government, the states, the federal district and the 
municipalities, and that  encourages  the adoption of the 
mechanisms of federal cooperation. However, the constitu-
tion did not clearly establish the responsibilities that each 
state must assume. This type of distribution of powers cre-
ated an environment conducive to producing overlapping 
actions, territorial inequalities in the provision of services 
and lowest common denominators in terms of national po-
licies (Arretche, 2004).
According to Dourado and Elias (2011), the first 
decade of the SUS was marked by an intense process 
of transferring resources and responsibilities to muni-
cipalities directly from the federal union, which was 
considered the leading formulator and funding source 
of health-care policy. Even so, the 1990s were marked 
by the underuse of cooperation mechanisms and dis-
putes between state and local governments regarding 
the administration of health services. The municipal 
structure alone was insufficient to meet the goals of the 
SUS because of the extreme diversity and inequality 
that characterizes the Brazilian federation. Thus, in the 
2000s, the concept of regionalization was introduced, 
which was designed to meet the "need for rationaliza-
tion of the system to address fragmentation in the pro-
vision of services and disparities of scale and produc-
tion capacity between the municipalities,  at risk of loss 
of efficiency and therefore worse outcomes"(Dourado 
& Elias, 2011, p. 207). The Operational Standard for 
Health-Care implemented through regionalization was 
not successful because of the resistance of the munici-
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palities to a possible "recentralization" by assigning the 
states the responsibility for regional planning (Doura-
do & Elias, 2011, p. 208).
Under these circumstances, the 2006 Health Pact was 
established, based on the idea from the Ministry of He-
alth and the Tripartite Inter-management Commission 
that for effective accountability, managers should come to 
an agreement, with negotiated commitments and defined 
goals to be achieved in a cooperative and supportive man-
ner (Dourado & Elias, 2011, p. 208). Regionalization was 
reaffirmed as a structural axis of the Management Pact, 
which is a sub-item of the Health Pact, for guiding the 
decentralization of health services. Thus, the health-care 
regions have been classified as a permanent space for sup-
portive and cooperative negotiation and co-management 
through a Regional Management Board (Ordinance/MS 
no. 399/2006). For Dourado and Elias (2011, p. 209), the-
se boards represent "a proposal for a balance between the 
two basic mechanisms of federal cooperation and coor-
dination: direct negotiations  among local governments 
(horizontal relationship) and induction by the central en-
tity (vertical relationship)."
Since the 2006 Health Pact, primary health-care servi-
ces are not viewed as shared responsibilities to be assumed 
by all of the municipalities. Other health services are allo-
cated in accord with the agreed rules or the complexity of 
the units that comprise a municipality’s service network. To 
reduce competing interests and clarify responsibilities, one 
function of the Management Pact is to establish the respon-
sibilities of each state, thus strengthening supportive and 
shared management in the SUS. 
The health-policy redesign has introduced new me-
chanisms of cooperation into the Brazilian federal system. 
However, "much of the literature specializing in federalism 
tends to be critical of the decrease in competition, poin-
ting out new problems that the increased intertwining of 
government tiers has brought to the federations" (Franzese, 
2010, p. 70).
One of these new problems is the impact on accounta-
bility. This problem appears because "cooperation tends to 
make it difficult for voters to identify which tier of govern-
ment is responsible for a particular policy." This difficulty 
discourages the use of the main mechanism of democratic 
accountability, which is "the ability for the citizen to hold 
a candidate responsible for what was done by him or by 
his party in the exercise of his duties" (Franzese, 2010, p. 
71). Citing Cameron and Simeon (2002), Franzese (2010, p. 
71) states that "part of the literature notes the cooperation 
between the governments as a form of 'collusion' by whi-
ch the participants in the negotiation decide according to 
what is best for them and not what is best for the citizen." 
Competition would prevent this “collusion,” forcing the go-
vernments to seek the best for their citizens because they 
are accountable.
In a specific analysis of the Unified Health System, 
Franzese (2010, p. 168) concludes that progress has been 
made regarding accountability and the terms of com-
mitment, which must be signed by the managers when 
agreeing to targets, thus establishing a new form of ac-
countability for results. Additionally, the same author 
argues that the role of state support for municipalities 
remains impractical and difficult in terms of accounta-
bility. Moreover, the author notes that the shift in focus 
to making states and municipalities responsible for or-
ganizing networks of activities makes it more difficult to 
establish accountability.
The agreed targets relating to the terms of commitment 
signed by the managers are in the context of recent efforts 
to modernize public administration, the focus of which is 
results-oriented management and efficient resource use. In 
negotiations between federal entities, the entities contrac-
tually agree to achieve outcomes in a set time period based 
on predetermined indicators. However, this development is 
recent, and the public authorities have gone through a le-
arning process regarding the incorporation of measures of 
efficiency and effectiveness in agreements signed not only 
with public-sector entities but also with the private sector 
(Trosa, 2001).
One inherent difficulty in evaluating the provision of 
public goods and services is the measurement of outputs, 
effects and outcomes. According to Cohen and Franco 
(2004), outputs are the tangible results of activities deve-
loped from the available inputs. Effects are the results of 
the use of those outputs. Outcomes are the consequences 
of the effects of a project or social program, i.e., the de-
gree to which objectives (the desired state) are achieved in 
relation to the target population. For example, municipal 
governments are monitoring the hypertensive population, 
for whom the outputs offered are medicine and doctor’s 
office appointments. This effort creates the effect of redu-
cing the rate of hospitalization for stroke patients, thus pro-
moting as an outcome a reduction in the mortality caused 
by hypertension.
The use of indicators of direct outputs as parameters for 
the contractualization of results is less complex than the 
use of indicators of effects or outcomes,  This is so because 
it is difficult to establish a direct relationship between the 
actions taken by the public managers and the effects and, 
particularly, the outcomes for the health status of the po-
pulation. In certain cases, there is a time lag between the 
actions and the changes in the indicators. Moreover, it is 
difficult to argue that the effects and outcomes were gene-
rated solely by the implementation of a particular public 
policy (Trosa, 2001).
Such considerations also apply when trying to rela-
te public-sector spending with the indicators of effects 
and outcomes, i.e., one must seek to identify how cur-
rent and previous spending influences the outcomes 
achieved in the public sector. This limitation is charac-
teristic of the evaluation models for the efficiency of 
expenditures in studies by authors such as Gupta and 
Verhoeven (2001), Afonso and Aubyn (2004), Retzlaff-
Roberts, Chang and Rubin (2004) and Mirmirani and 
Mirmirani (2005). Moreover, it is important to consi-
der the influence of programs from other areas on he-
alth indicators. 
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Studies that adopt the country as the unit of analysis 
eliminate a major difficulty in comparative performan-
ce evaluation: the flow of patients and resources between 
governments. Marino (2003) and Faria, Jannuzzi and Silva 
(2008) performed studies on the technical efficiency of the 
health-care sector in Rio de Janeiro’s municipalities. Howe-
ver, the studies did not consider the flow of the patients and 
resources or the homogeneous structures of production. 
These omissions limit the robustness of the results. 
The public sector is going through a learning process 
regarding the contractualization of results. However, to en-
sure that the public managers can be held accountable for 
the outcome of their activities, more effort is required. The 
contractualization of results in terms of direct outputs is 
an improvement, although insufficient for evaluating the 
performance of the municipal managers regarding the ap-
plication of public resources because providing health-care 
procedures at the lowest cost is not the same as achieving 
effectiveness with the lowest possible use of resources. The 
change in the health status of the population depends on 
how many and which treatments are provided by govern-
ment programs and other health factors. For example, the 
combination of preventive and curative measures may have 
a greater impact on stroke mortality than offering only 
curative treatment. At the same time, a health impact de-
pends to a certain degree on the behavior and lifestyle of 
the population, such as tobacco use.
Shared and solidary management, typical of coopera-
tive federalism, imposes additional restrictions on perfor-
mance evaluation, particularly the comparative one, and 
on the accountability of the municipal administrators. The 
results achieved in a given region  hardly ever can be indi-
vidualized for each municipality. The municipal managers 
abide by results based on indicators such as infant mortali-
ty and neonatal mortality. Even considering the sensitivity 
of these indicators in relation to primary health-care, the 
municipal managers depend on a regionalized health-care 
network for cases involving procedures of medium and 
high complexity, particularly in small municipalities.
Alternatively, for indicators to have an impact, an agree-
ment must be reached by the health-care regions rather than 
the municipalities. In such a case, problems relating to high 
complexity would remain because the health-care regions 
would be able to provide only a certain degree of resolution 
within their territory, with sufficient resolution in prima-
ry health-care and some resolution of average complexity 
(Ordinance/MS. No. 399/2006). To ensure that attention is 
directed to problems of high and to some extent average 
complexity, the regions should make inter-regional arran-
gements, including macro-regional aggregation (Ordinan-
ce/MS. 399/2006). Thus, the most suitable unit of analysis 
to evaluate impact would be the macro-region. However, 
this scale might favor the shifting of responsibility among 
the municipal managers when the time comes to assign the 
blame for goals that are not met by the macro-region.
Finally, the accountability of the managers for the effi-
ciency of public spending based on the provision of direct 
outputs is far less complex than the evaluation of spending 
efficiency based on effects and particularly the outcomes 
caused by the implementation of health-care services. Eva-
luating the performance of the municipal administrators 
is much more readily achievable in the former case. Ho-
wever, the key point is whether individuals are becoming 
healthier, and assessing this point implies a more complex 
municipal accountability because of the indicators involved 
and the interrelationships of the federal entities that pro-
mote health-care.
In primary health-care, which is defined as a non-sha-
red sub-function, the balance between the mechanisms of 
federal cooperation and competition can favor accountabi-
lity and the achievement of better results by the health sys-
tem. The performance of the municipal managers regarding 
primary health-care affects the results of the health-care 
regions and macro-regions because primary health-care is 
the gateway to the health system and is responsible for the 
system’s organization. The emphasis of primary health-care 
is on prevention rather than curative treatments, the latter 
being more typical of ambulatory and hospital-based care 
of medium and high complexity. Therefore, the good per-
formance of the municipal managers in primary health-ca-
re contributes to the good performance of the health-care 
networks and ultimately of the entire SUS.
 3 tHE EvaluatIon oF tHE tEcHnIcal EFFIcIEncy oF PRIMaRy HEaltH-
caRE: MEtHodoloGIcal aSPEctS 
 3.1 the Survey Population.
The unit of analysis in this study was the municipality, 
which is responsible for the sub-function of primary heal-
th-care. The population was composed of municipalities in 
the São Paulo Metropolitan Region (Região Metropolitana 
de São Paulo – RMSP), selected because of the importance 
of their economy to Brazil and their socioeconomic diver-
sity. The RMSP consists of 39 municipalities divided into 
seven health-care regions. It has approximately 20 million 
inhabitants and is responsible for 57.3% of the state gross 
domestic product (GDP), 19.4% of the national GDP and 
25% of the taxes collected in the country. In addition, the 
RMSP contains municipalities with different levels of qua-
lity of life (Observa Saúde, 2011). The study was conducted 
through a census of the municipalities of the region.
The municipalities of Guarulhos and São Paulo are the 
most populous of the RMSP, with 11,037,590 and 1,299,283 
inhabitants, respectively, and represent two health-care re-
gions of the state of São Paulo. The other five regions and 
their respective populations are Alto do Tietê (1,511,076), 
Franco da Rocha (519,696), Grande ABC (2,605,266), Ma-
nanciais (974,620) and Rota dos Bandeirantes (1,829,553).
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The municipalities of each health-care region establish 
commitments based on the priorities, goals, targets and in-
dicators of the Pact for Life and the Management Pact that 
comprise the Health Pact (Ordinance MS no. 2669/2009). 
Depending on  the type of indicator (e.g., indicators rela-
ting to the priority of reducing infant and maternal mor-
tality), agreement is only possible if there is cooperation 
between the federal entities. 
One priority of the Health Pact is to strengthen primary 
health-care, the indicators for which have been generally 
agreed on since 2007. The specific primary health-care in-
dicators are of two basic types: coverage and effects. 
 3.2 data-analysis techniques.
One parameter for evaluating government performance 
is the efficiency and capacity of an entity to obtain maxi-
mum outputs at the lowest cost. To measure the efficiency 
of primary health-care, it is necessary to know the produc-
tion function of municipalities, i.e., how resources are used 
to produce the system outputs. In practice, there is no defi-
ned production function. The function must be estimated 
from a data sample using parametric or non-parametric 
methods, in the latter case with DEA because DEA is con-
sidered appropriate to evaluate the efficiency of decision-
making units (DMUs) that produce multiple outputs.
First used by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), DEA 
is an optimization technique based on linear programming 
and designed to establish a measure of relative efficiency 
among different DMUs. The various DEA models are ba-
sed on the analysis of the efficiency of DMUs with mul-
tiple inputs and outputs and the idea of constructing an 
efficiency frontier. The most efficient DMUs are located on 
the frontier, whereas the less efficient DMUs are not. The 
geometric shape of the surrounding surface depends on the 
DEA model used.
DEA models may have orientations to maximize outputs 
or minimize inputs, and the variables depend on whether 
the administrator has more control over inputs or outputs. 
In this study, the BCC model (Banker, Charnes and Coo-
per, 1984) was used with an orientation towards outputs be-
cause public-health managers have a set budget and should 
seek to provide the largest possible number of procedures 
and services within certain quality standards using the re-
sources they have available. Currently, a main challenge for 
the SUS is to ensure citizen access to health services, which 
relates to demands to increase the budgetary resources of 
the health-care system, given that the system cannot fully 
meet the needs of the population. The BCC model consi-
ders variable returns to scale, which proved to be adequate 
after preliminary analyses of the data.
For the analysis of efficiency, it is assumed that there 
are n DMUs to be evaluated. Each DMU consumes varying 
quantities of m different inputs to produce s different ou-
tputs. Specifically, DMUj uses the quantity xij of input i, 
and produces yrj of output r. It is assumed that xij > 0 and 
yrj > 0 and furthermore that each DMU has at least one 
positive input and output value. Mathematically, the model 
can be expressed as follows:
max   +ε    si +   sr
    xij λj+si = xi0     i=1,2...., m; 
    yrj λj -sr =  yr0    r=1,2...., s; 
λj > 0                    j=1,2...., n;
   λj=1
The technical efficiency score is given by the measure 
1<θ<∞, and θ-1 is the proportional increase in outputs that 
could be achieved by a DMU, maintaining the number of 
inputs constant. It was observed that 100/θ defines the tech-
nical efficiency score, which varies between zero and 100%. 
A value of θ indicates that all of the outputs can be increa-
sed simultaneously at the same rate without changing the 
mix by which they are produced. 
The slacks si or sr that are not equal to zero indicate that 
it is possible to reduce the inputs or to increase the outputs 
which would necessarily change the proportion of the ou-
tputs. In other words, for the orientation towards outputs, 
the efficiency score θ indicates the proportional increase of 
all of the outputs of a DMU, given the DMU’s current pro-
duction standard. However, with the resources available, a 
DMU could produce a larger quantity of some of the ou-
tputs, indicating "mix inefficiencies," i.e., according to the 
combination of the outputs it provides (Cooper, Seiford, & 
Tone 2007.)
To complement the study, comparative analyses of the 
DEA results were performed with indicators of the streng-
thening of primary health-care specific to each municipali-
ty and aggregated by health-care region. 
 3.3 Efficiency Model variables.
Initially, we might think of relating indicators of the 
Health Pact referring to the priority Strengthening Prima-
ry Health-Care with the expenditure made with such sub-
function. However, the limitations discussed above regar-
ding the relation of budgetary and performance resources 
to effect indicators would exist. In addition, there are res-
trictions related to DEA regarding measures of the varia-
bles under analysis. As noted by Dyson et al. (2001), indices 
typically associated with performance measures should not 
be mixed with levels of activity or volume measurements 
because the mixing would cause distortions in the calcula-
ted efficiency scores. For example, to obtain 55% coverage 
with the PSF, the municipality of São Paulo would have to 
spend significantly more than any other municipality in 
the RMSP. In DEA, when comparing expenditure values 
with the coverage percentage, São Paulo would be consi-
dered inefficient. The solution would be to use per capita 
expenditure values, although distortions would persist be-
cause the base composition of the indicators is not always 
the total population.
Therefore, we chose to estimate the primary health-care 
production frontier based on volume measurements. The 
outputs are represented by the number of primary health-
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 Table 1  Input and Output Variables of the Technical Efficiency Model of the Municipalities of the Metropolitan Region of 
São Paulo, 2009
Type Variable Description Source
INPUT 1 Primary health-care expenditure Total expenditure on primary health-care sub-function SIOPS/DATASUS
OUTPUT 1 Health-promotion and preventative care Number of procedures SIA/DATASUS
OUTPUT 2 Diagnostic procedures Number of procedures SIA/DATASUS
OUTPUT 3 Clinical procedures Number of procedures SIA/DATASUS
OUTPUT 4 Surgical procedures Number of procedures SIA/DATASUS
OUTPUT 5 Complementary primary health-care Number of procedures SIA/DATASUS
OUTPUT 6 Families registered by the PSF and PACS Number of families registered in the PSF and PACS SIAB/DATASUS
 Table 2  Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Technical Efficiency Model, in per Capita and Coverage Terms: 
RMSP Municipalities, 2009
Statistic Mean Standard devia-tion Minimum Maximum
Percentiles
25 50 75
Primary health-care expenditure 158.740 95.371 33.976 469.338 86.534 149.574 208.819
Promotion/prevention 1.592 1.237 0.025 5.160 0.539 1.636 2.354
Diagnostic procedures 1.015 0.650 0.226 3.126 0.550 0.778 1.317
Clinical procedures 4.912 2.241 1.826 9.728 3.009 4.433 6.761
Surgical procedures 0.201 0.095 0.062 0.397 0.130 0.181 0.284
Complementary health-care 0.008 0.005 0.000 0.022 0.005 0.007 0.011
PSF/PACS coverage 34.189 27.231 0.000 100.000 12.678 28.770 51.603
Source: DATASUS, 2011.
care procedures grouped according to the specific type of 
service and the number of families enrolled in the PSF and 
the PACS and the inputs by expenditure in this sub-func-
tion.
The initial concept was to break down the spending on 
primary health-care into its main components: personnel 
and taxes, outsourcing, consumables and materials for free 
distribution, among others. This breakdown would enable 
us to understand the decisions related to the composition 
of the spending and to exclude from the analysis the ex-
penditure values that do not contribute to the generation 
of products (such as pensions, retirement benefits and con-
tributions) or that benefit production in several activities, 
which is the case for capital expenditure. 
However, the relationship between the number of cases 
and the variables did not provide a good fit for the model 
because the data from the Court of Accounts of the State 
of São Paulo, whose source were the municipal authorities’ 
balance sheets as delivered to the Electronic Audit System 
of the State of São Paulo (Auditoria Eletrônica do Estado de 
São Paulo – AUDESP), were obtained from only 33 of the 
39 RMSP municipalities, and the data from two of the mu-
nicipalities were inconsistent with those provided to the In-
formation System on Public Health Budgets (Sistema de In-
formações sobre Orçamentos Públicos em Saúde – SIOPS). 
Thus, the decision was made to choose aggregate primary 
health-care expenditure data as the input variable.
For the RMSP municipalities, we estimated a produc-
tion function consisting of an input and six products direc-
tly related to primary health-care activities, including the 
PSF and PACS (outputs 1-6), as shown in Table 1. The data 
are for 2009.
Three municipalities were excluded from analysis because of a lack of data on primary health-care expenditure: Franco 
da Rocha, Guararema and Juquitiba. 
 4 RESultS
The descriptive statistics of the variables in the effi-
ciency model in per capita terms shows a wide dispersion 
of municipality data in terms of both spending on primary 
health-care and the number of procedures performed. The 
same can be said regarding the coverage of the PACS and 
PSF programs. 
According to Table 2, the per capita expenditure on 
primary health-care varies widely among the municipali-
ties. Whereas the group comprising the 25% of the govern-
ments that spend the least has per capita values of up to R$ 
86.53, the group comprising the 25% of the governments 
that spend the most has per capita values  exceeding R$ 
208.82. Additionally, there is substantial variability in the 
per capita number of health-care services and procedures 
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 Figure 1  The Representativeness of the Output 
Improvement Targets
offered to the population in each municipality, with the ex-
ception of surgical procedures and complementary health-
care. The emphasis is on clinical procedures and health-
fostering and disease-prevention activities. PSF coverage is 
one of the targets agreed on in the Health Pact. However, 
there are municipalities that had not joined either of the 
two programs (PSF and PACS). 
To estimate the efficiency frontier, the input variables 
are expected to be positively correlated with the product 
variables. All of the outputs of the model showed statisti-
cally significant correlations with the primary health-care 
spending at a significance level of 0.01.
The technical-efficiency frontier estimated by DEA was 
formed by 7 of the 36 cities under analysis. The other 29 
municipalities are off the frontier, i.e., they should provide 
more health services given their expenditure on primary 
health-care. The results indicate that 19.44% of the munici-
palities were efficient and that 80.56% were inefficient. 
When only the inefficient municipalities are analyzed, 
the mean efficiency score is 42.75%, indicating that the su-
pply of direct primary health-care products could be incre-
ased by an average of 57.25% without directing additional 
public financial resources to health-care. Regarding the 
general evaluation of the representativeness of the output 
improvement targets, as shown in Figure 1, the efforts of 
the inefficient municipalities should be directed towards 
increasing PACS/PSF coverage, the number of health-fos-
tering and preventative services and diagnostic procedu-
res. This conclusion considers proportional increases for 
the efficiency score and the possibility of non-proportional 
increases represented by the slacks. 
Table 3 shows the efficiency scores and indicators for 
the strengthening of primary health-care for each munici-
pality and the mean and standard deviation of each respec-
tive region. The analysis of the municipalities within their 
respective regions facilitates discussion on federal coopera-
tion and competition issues.
The municipality/region of São Paulo is considered 
to be efficient. The same cannot be said of Guarulhos, 
which has an efficiency score lower than that of four 
other municipalities, three of which belong to the Ma-
nanciais region. 
The two least efficient municipalities of the RMSP are 
Biritiba-Mirim and Cotia, which are located in the Alto do 
Tietê and Mananciais regions, respectively. In the analysis 
of the disaggregated expenditure data, these municipalities 
had the highest percentage of capital expenditure; thus, it 
was expected that the volume of their activities would be 
increased. Notably, by removing capital expenditure inputs, 
Cotia becomes more inefficient and Biritiba-Mirim re-
mains among the most inefficient. The latter municipality 
had the second highest percentage of expenditure on social 
grants, trailing only Salesópolis.
With the exception of the regions of Franco da Rocha 
and Guarulhos, there is at least one efficient municipality 
in each region, with a larger concentration in the Grande 
ABC region, which achieved the second highest mean effi-
ciency score. The lowest mean score is in the region of Rota 
dos Bandeirantes, where all of the municipalities had low 
efficiency rates, except for Osasco, which was considered to 
be efficient. Elsewhere, there are large differences between 
municipalities in terms of technical efficiency. 
One matter relating to disaggregated expenditure data 
merits further attention. Diadema, Suzano and Embu are 
among the most efficient municipalities, and their highest 
concentration of expenditure is on third-party services, in 
the proportion of 47%, 85% and 68%, respectively. These 
municipalities did not provide values for personnel and ex-
penses, indicating that they did not work with their own 
personnel or that they had not been able to adequately clas-
sify spending.
In relation to primary health-care indicators and after 
applying Spearman's correlation analysis to the efficiency 
scores, it became clear that there is no statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the technical efficiency of spen-
ding and better performance of the indicators.
In relation to PSF coverage (IND 1), the national ex-
pectation was that in 2010, the number of registered fami-
lies would be 54.5%. However, in 2009, on average, there 
was no region whose indicator was at this level, with all 
of the regions being well below the predicted value. When 
the municipalities are considered individually, only São 
Lourenço da Serra, Cajamar and Diadema were within the 
target area. In 2009, eight municipalities had not yet joined 
the Family Health Strategy.
Regarding prenatal consultations (IND 2), the regional 
mean values were similar, and only four municipalities in 
Alto do Tietê had not reached the desired value of 62.91% 
of mothers who gave birth to a living child and had seven or 
more consultations. These municipalities were Suzano, Sa-
lesópolis (municipalities considered technically efficient), 
Itaquaquecetuba and Biritiba-Mirim.
Hospitalization for diabetes mellitus (IND 3) was on 
average at the desired level (less than or equal to six per 
10,000 inhabitants in 2010) in all of the regions except 
Alto do Tietê, which contains two municipalities with 
values higher than expected for the national target: Sa-
lesópolis (21.2) and Santa Isabel (6.5). Moreover, in the 
Rota dos Bandeirantes region, Jandira had an indicator 
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 Table 3   Technical Efficiency Scores and the Strengthening of the Primary Health-Care Indicators: RMSP Municipalities 
according to Health-care Region, 2009
Region Municipality Score
Strengthening of Basic Care
IND1 IND2 IND3 IND4 IND5 IND6 IND7 IND8
São Paulo São Paulo 100.0% 30.1 74.1 2.9 5.5 21.2 4.0 1.0







São Lourenço da Serra 100.0% 75.5 64.0 1.4 1.4 2.2 71.9 0.0 13.6
Embu 79.7% 22.7 66.8 2.1 6.1 4.4 55.8 12.5 13.7
Itapecirica da Serra 73.7% 2.1 71.7 3.1 7.7 1.7 90.0 2.1 9.8
Taboão da Serra 69.5% 37.2 69.1 5.2 7.5 3.0 47.4 10.6 12.9
Embu-Guaçu 44.9% 20.9 68.9 5.1 5.1 5.1 63.1 16.7 1.4
Vargem Grande Paulista 31.0% 31.6 74.1 1.2 6.4 6.2 71.0 23.1 10.2
Cotia 16.9% 4.3 71.5 3.5 5.7 2.2 62.0 5.7 0.7
Mean 59.4% 27.8 69.4 3.1 5.7 3.5 65.9 10.1 8.9












Osasco 100.0% 0.0 72.6 1.5 5.4 2.4 26.9 0.0 7.4
Barueri 35.5% 0.0 87.5 2.7 6.9 2.1 59.5 0.0 21.9
Carapicuíba 34.8% 0.0 63.9 3.7 7.0 2.4 42.2 0.0 0.0
Itapevi 29.8% 32.6 68.6 1.5 7.0 4.7 31.1 8.4 0.0
Pirapora do Bom Jesus 24.2% 32.4 73.8 1.8 3.7 7.4 24.0 22.0 0.0
Jandira 22.6% 0.0 75.4 7.9 4.0 2.5 71.5 0.0 3.8
Santana de Parnaíba 20.7% 4.8 80.1 0.4 1.1 5.5 96.2 6.0 4.9
Mean 38.2% 10.0 74.6 2.8 5.0 3.8 50.2 5.2 5.4









Mairiporã 72.9% 26.4 83.5 3.2 3.5 2.8 38.3 8.7 9.6
Caieiras 38.3% 0.0 71.5 2.9 1.4 3.2 50.8 0.0 9.6
Cajamar 29.5% 65.9 89.1 1.2 6.4 4.4 68.8 32.5 11.6
Francisco Morato 29.1% 49.5 61.8 6.2 8.4 4.1 47.0 15.4 0.0
Mean 42.4% 35.4 76.5 3.4 4.9 3.6 51.2 14.1 7.7







Diadema 100.0% 83.6 78.4 2.6 8.7 2.7 42.2 41.6 3.5
Santo André 100.0% 16.9 76.8 3.8 4.0 2.4 31.5 4.1 0.2
São Caetano do Sul 100.0% 51.3 86.1 3.2 6.8 0.4 80.9 18.2 0.6
São Bernardo do Campo 47.3% 6.2 80.6 2.1 7.3 2.2 46.5 0.0 0.5
Mauá 36.0% 36.2 79.6 2.3 6.3 2.2 46.7 0.0 0.1
Ribeirão Pires 34.0% 0.0 82.9 2.8 6.0 3.7 22.2 0.0 2.9
Rio Grande da Serra 30.5% 35.2 73.9 1.3 7.0 2.2 17.9 0.0 0.4
Mean 64.0% 32.8 79.8 2.6 6.6 2.3 41.1 9.1 1.2








Suzano 100.0% 10.7 58.2 1.5 2.2 3.1 56.4 4.9 0.5
Salesópolis 100.0% 0.0 51.6 21.2 11.4 4.0 41.1 0.0 0.5
Mogi das Cruzes 58.8% 6.5 69.5 4.4 6.4 4.3 36.2 0.0 0.0
Santa Isabel 55.2% 51.2 83.4 6.5 18.5 4.4 51.1 36.8 4.5
Itaquaquecetuba 52.1% 7.2 58.4 3.0 7.4 2.6 32.8 0.0 0.0
Poá 40.1% 28.0 73.5 5.7 4.8 2.4 65.8 6.1 0.1
Ferraz de Vasconcelos 35.5% 33.7 73.5 4.8 4.9 2.5 88.9 0.0 11.5
Arujá 21.2% 0.0 70.0 1.6 3.2 2.1 67.6 0.0 0.3
Biritiba-Mirim 15.5% 52.3 58.7 2.8 13.8 4.2 83.3 11.6 0.0
Mean 53.2% 21.1 66.3 5.7 8.1 3.3 58.1 6.6 1.9
Standard Deviation 30.3% 20.9 10.2 6.1 5.4 0.9 20.0 12.0 3.8
The same cannot be said of hospitalizations for stroke 
in the SUS (IND 4), where the national value expected for 
2010 was 5.2/10,000 inhabitants. On average, only the Rota 
dos Bandeirantes and Franco da Rocha regions were under 
the desired level in 2009. The worst performers in relation 
to this indicator were the regions of Alto do Tietê, Guaru-
lhos and Grande ABC. Of the 36 municipalities, only nine 
were within the expected limits.
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In relation to the percentage of children under five 
years of age who were underweight for their age (IND 
5), in 2009, two municipalities of Rota dos Bandeirantes 
(Itapevi and Pirapora do Bom Jesus) did not attain the 
desired value of 4.4% for 2010. Regarding the monito-
ring of families enrolled in the Family Grant Program 
(Programa Bolsa Família – PBF) (IND 6), in 2009, on 
average, all of the regions still had to struggle to achieve 
the target set nationally for 2010 of at least 70% of mo-
nitored families. Three municipalities in the Mananciais 
region met the minimum expected level (São Lourenço 
da Serra, Itapecerica da Serra and Vargem Grande Pau-
lista), as well as two from Rota dos Bandeirantes (Jan-
dira and Santana do Parnaíba), one from Grande ABC 
(São Caetano do Sul) and two from Alto do Tietê (Ferraz 
de Vasconcelos and Biritiba-Mirim).
Indicators relating to oral health were included in the 
pact from 2011 on (Ordinance/MS no. 3.840/2010). With 
the exception of Diadema, the estimated population cove-
rage by oral-health teams (IND 7) of 40% was not being 
met in 2009, and 14 municipalities had no oral-health te-
ams deployed in their territory. The mean for the collecti-
ve health-care activity of supervised tooth brushing (IND 
8) in 2009 was within the desired 2011 levels of 3% in 15 
municipalities. The biggest shortfalls were in the cities of 
São Paulo, Guarulhos and the municipalities belonging to 
the Rota dos Bandeirantes, Grande ABC and Alto do Tietê 
regions.
Finally, large differences can be observed between mu-
nicipalities in the same region in technical efficiency and 
in relation to the strengthening of the primary health-care 
indicators, and the municipalities that were more efficient 
in their use of resources were not necessarily those that 
presented the best pact indicators. 
 5 dIScuSSIon and FInal conSIdERatIonS
The main contribution of the present study was to dis-
cuss the possibilities and limitations of the comparative 
evaluation of performance in relation to public spending 
and the influence of the federative structure on such a pro-
cess, particularly within the scope of the SUS. 
Primary health-care, when regarded by the SUS as the 
sole responsibility of the municipalities, instills characte-
ristics of the competitive federalism into health policy, pro-
moting both the accountability of public officials with res-
pect to the results achieved with the expenditure of public 
funds, and the comparative evaluation of performance. 
The technical efficiency analysis of municipalities with 
regard to spending on primary health-care indicates that 
municipalities within the same health-care region and the 
health-care regions within the RMSP can differ substan-
tially in performance. Misused resources in a municipality 
or health-care region create a negative impact on the entire 
system because failure at the primary health-care level may 
increase the pressure on outpatient and hospital services 
for medium- and high-complexity cases. For example, the 
failure to control blood pressure within the population can 
lead to an increase in the number of hospitalizations. In 
each region, the existence of one or a few municipalities 
with exceptional efficiency may reflect the opportunistic 
attempts of other municipalities to pass the costs of the 
health-care system onto the entire region. Thus, coopera-
tion within the SUS does not appear sufficient to inhibit 
predatory financial behavior, which would be an advantage 
of this type of federalism as described by Abrúcio (2005).
The use of comparative performance evaluation through 
DEA encourages the mutual control among governments 
by indicating those governments that could increase the 
volume of services rendered to the population within the 
budget they have available. Competition promotes the se-
arch for innovation. DEA identifies the practices that were 
successful in the use of public resources and cases in which 
a municipality may be employed as a benchmark for others. 
Therefore, if used by control agencies, the comparative per-
formance assessment facilitates the creation of parameters 
for evaluating public officials and promotes the benefits of 
competitive federalism.
Although primary health-care is not a shared sub-func-
tion, horizontal relationships between the municipalities 
occur when their goals are agreed on. That is, the practice 
of the municipalities is affected by the priorities set by the 
Health Pact and the agreements reached in the municipali-
ties’ respective regions. In this sense, primary health-care is 
not viewed in isolation but as part of a regionalized health-
care network. Thus, budgetary resources that appear to be 
exclusive to each municipality come to be viewed as resour-
ce common to the entire health-care system.
Therefore, the differences in the municipalities' prima-
ry health-care indicators should be handled carefully by the 
regional boards, bearing in mind that one of the characte-
ristics of federal cooperation is to assist less powerful gover-
nments (Abrúcio, 2005). In the strengthening of primary 
health-care, five indicators are related to service coverage. 
Thus, the efficient use of available resources can facilitate 
the achievement of the goals set by the indicators. Additio-
nally, regional management facilitates better performance 
of the health-care system by disseminating successful ad-
ministrative formulas, i.e., the innovative practices of the 
municipalities that are considered efficient.
Achieving coverage objectives with the efficient use 
of resources does not guarantee the improvement of the 
population’s health. In other words, providing more direct 
products at the lowest cost does not imply the effectiveness 
of the system. However, it is in the citizen's interest to know 
how public funds are used, as noted by Trosa (2001).
The assessment of effects and outcomes requires rigor 
of its own, because it is necessary to identify the actions 
that generated the results, to know the territorial limits, the 
time and the environmental variables that influenced the 
achievement of the results. In this sense, comparative effec-
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tiveness evaluation becomes more complex, and within the 
SUS, such evaluation should be performed using regions or 
macro-regions as units of analysis rather than municipali-
ties. An exception to this approach can be made in which 
the effects can be attributed to the achievements of the mu-
nicipal manager, such as the reduction of hospitalizations 
due to diabetes and stroke. However, the regional scale can 
encourage the shifting of responsibility among municipal 
managers when they are to be held accountable for goals 
not achieved by the region or macro-region, making ac-
countability difficult. According to Franzese (2010), this 
problem is typical of cooperative federalism. 
The existence of this problem does not mean that the 
contractualization of results cannot include effect or outco-
me indicators, which are in fact desirable. In the analysis 
of individual cases, it is less complex to identify specific 
actions that led to certain results. Therefore, the control-
lership functions performed by comparative evaluations 
differ from those performed within the limits of public or-
ganizations that are related, for example, to a government 
program. To perform quality control on public spending, it 
is important to understand the limits and potential of each 
performance assessment method, particularly in relation to 
the context in which the method is used. This understan-
ding can make institutional organization possible through 
internal, external and social control of the performance of 
duties.  
The comparative evaluation of government performan-
ce depends fundamentally on the quality of data available 
to citizens. However, one major limitation of the present 
study relates to the lack of data or their inconsistency. It was 
not possible to work with costs broken down by elements, 
and three municipalities were excluded from analysis be-
cause of missing data. If there is no transparency, then it is 
impossible to achieve accountability for public spending.
In future research, further analysis should be performed 
regarding the discrepancies between the municipalities and 
the role of the regional boards in addressing the discrepan-
cies. Additionally, it would be appropriate to extend the 
analysis to other health-care regions and periods.
